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I. Introduction
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, aimed at alleviating long-run pov-
erty by fostering the accumulation of human capital among children living
in indigent households and at reducing current poverty through the transfer
payment, have attracted much attention in recent years. Such welfare programs
have long been established in developed countries, with widespread targeting
of tuition subsidies to less well-off families, but are relatively new to less
developed economies. A conditional food transfer program, the Food for Ed-
ucation program, was one of the first of its kind to be implemented in the
We would like to thank Carolina Mejias and Julieta Trias for computing the SISBEN index from
the Demographic and Health Survey data; Marcos Vera Herna´ndez and Diana Lopez for useful
comments; several researchers at SEI, the data collection firm responsible for the survey; and
researchers at the Departamento de Planeacion Nacional in Colombia; as well as two anonymous
referees for useful suggestions. Contact the corresponding author, Emla Fitzsimons, at emla_f@
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early 1990s in Bangladesh, although the first large-scale conditional cash
transfer program was PROGRESA (now known as Oportunidades) launched
in Mexico in 1997.1 More recently, CCT programs have been implemented
extensively in developing countries, such as Colombia, Nicaragua, Honduras,
Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, and Turkey, with the main aim of inducing parents
to send their children to school. In this study, we evaluate the effect of the
CCT program Familias en Accio´n (FA) on children’s school and work partic-
ipation. This program has been operating in rural parts of Colombia since
2002.
The upsurge in conditional cash transfer programs in developing countries
has been matched by widespread evaluation of such programs, with the evi-
dence all pointing to positive impacts on school enrollment (for a review, see
Rawlings and Rubio 2005; and Handa and Davis 2006). The first contribution
of this study is to add to and corroborate this existing body of evidence using
the Familias en Accio´n welfare program (in so doing, it also extends the results
contained in Attanasio et al. [2005, 2006]). Evidence that the program has
increased school enrollment does not imply a reduction in child labor of the
same magnitude, however, as time spent at work and school may not be
perfectly substitutable. The second contribution of the study is to investigate
the effects of the program on the time spent by children in school and work
activities. This, of course, has some bearing on current household poverty, but
also the extent to which the intensive margin of schooling responds to the
program may be of greater policy relevance than the extensive margin. The
evidence on this is, however, less pervasive, with some exceptions such as
Skoufias and Parker (2001) and Rubio-Codina (2002), who find positive im-
pacts of PROGRESA on time at school and negative impacts on time at work.
The program Familias en Accio´n was not randomly assigned across localities.
However, considerable effort was put into choosing the control areas in the
design stage of the evaluation so as to ensure that they were as similar as
possible to the treated areas, and we will provide evidence in Section III that
this effort was rewarded. Nonetheless, we cannot rule out the fact that the
areas may differ in unobserved dimensions relevant to the outcomes of interest.
We thus estimate the effects of the program within a difference-in-differences
framework, using pre- and postprogram data on outcomes, and conditioning
on a large range of household- and municipality-level characteristics.
We find that the program increased school enrollment rates of 14–17-year-
old children quite substantially, by between 5 and 7 percentage points. It
1
See Schultz (2004) on the PROGRESA program, and Ahmed and Del Ninno (2002) on the Food
for Education program.
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increased the already high enrollment of 8–13-year-old children by between
around 1 and 3 percentage points.
For work-related outcomes, we find that the effects of the program are
generally largest for younger children, whose participation in domestic work
decreased by around 10–13 percentage points after the program but whose
participation in income-generating work remained largely unaffected. We also
find evidence of school and work time being less than fully substitutable,
suggesting that some, but not all, of the increased time at school may be
drawn from children’s leisure time. This finding reinforces the extensive-
margin finding of Ravallion and Wodon (2000) that children’s school and
work participation are not perfectly substitutable.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we describe the program and
the context of the rural Colombian communities in which it was implemented.
Section III provides a discussion of the surveys as well as some descriptive
statistics relating to school enrollment and time use before the program started.
In Section IV, we present our results, first for school enrollment and then for
time spent in various work activities and school. Section V concludes.
II. The Familias en Accio´n Program
The Familias en Accio´n program is aimed at alleviating poverty by fostering
human capital accumulation among the poorest households in Colombia. Mod-
eled on the Mexican PROGRESA (now Oportunidades), it consists of con-
ditional subsidies for investments into education, nutrition, and health. Such
interventions are typically justified by positive externalities that human capital
might confer, by the existence of liquidity constraints, and/or by other reasons
such as excessive discounting of the future utility of children by parents or
myopia (see Das, Do, and Ozler [2005] for a synthesis of the theoretical
arguments underlying conditional cash transfers). While positive externalities
could justify making the transfer conditional, that is, paid only if the household
complies with certain conditions, an unconditional transfer should be sufficient
to overcome liquidity constraints.
The largest component of the program is the education one, targeted at
families with children aged 7 through 17. Subsidies, paid to the mother of
the child(ren), are granted conditional on the child(ren) attending at least
80% of school classes. The amounts of the subsidy are 14,000 pesos (US$6.15)
and 28,000 pesos (US$12.30) for children attending primary and secondary
school, respectively.2 Making the grant conditional on school attendance ef-
2
These are the amounts in 2002, with an average annual exchange rate of US$1 p 2.275 Colombian
pesos.
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fectively decreases the relative price of education (Ravallion and Wodon 2000).
The level of the grant was chosen so as to substitute, at least in part, the
income the household would forgo if increased schooling involved reductions
in income-generating activities. It should be noted, however, that for house-
holds that would have sent their child(ren) to school on a regular basis anyway,
the change in relative price will not affect their decision to send their child(ren)
to school, so the grant is effectively an unconditional transfer that increases
household income. However, it might still bring about changes in household
behavior, due not only to the increase in income but also to the additional
income being managed by a female member of the household.3
A second subsidy is available for improving nutrition. A flat-rate monthly
monetary supplement of 46,500 pesos (approximately US$20.45) is provided
to mothers of beneficiary families with children aged 0 through 6. Its receipt
is conditional on fulfilling certain health care requirements, including vac-
cinations and growth and development check-ups for children, and attendance
at courses on nutrition, hygiene, and contraception by the children’s mothers.
The targeting of the program took place in two stages. First, 622 out of
the 1,098 municipalities in Colombia were deemed eligible to qualify for the
program, on the basis of fulfilling the following criteria: (i) it has fewer than
100,000 inhabitants and is not a departmental capital, (ii) it has basic education
and health infrastructure, (iii) it has a bank, and (iv) the municipality ad-
ministrative office has relatively up-to-date welfare lists and other important
official documents. Next, eligible households were identified in qualifying
towns. Eligibility was established on the basis of a six-level welfare indicator,
SISBEN, which is determined from the first principal component of a number
of variables related to poverty. SISBEN has been used in Colombia to target
most preceding welfare programs, as well as for the pricing of utilities (see
Ve´lez, Castan˜o, and Deutsch 1998). This indicator is updated regularly, and
at the time of the survey was last updated in December 1999. FA was targeted
to households registered as SISBEN level 1 (in extreme poverty), living in
target municipalities, and with children younger than 18.
The program was funded by a loan from the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) to the Colombian government in 2000,
to cover the costs of running the program for 3 years. It started operating in
2001 or 2002, depending on the municipality. The sequential phasing in had
important implications for the evaluation methodology, discussed in Section
3
The perceived importance of the intrahousehold mechanism is implicit in the fact that most
CCTs are paid to mothers.
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IV. In the first 2 years of the program, 340,000 households were registered
to participate. The program has recently been expanded to an additional 60,000
households and is currently being piloted in deprived urban areas.
III. Data
In this section, we describe the survey and present some descriptive statistics
relating to our sample. First, we provide evidence that treatment and control
areas are similar along an extensive range of observed household and munic-
ipality characteristics. Second, we show trends in school enrollment for 3
years—two of which are preprogram for one set of treatment areas, and one
of which is preprogram for the other set of treatment areas (we return to this
below). This not only gives a flavor as to how school enrollment rates vary
across areas but also alerts one to possible anticipation effects of the program,
in other words, individuals changing current behavior in the knowledge (or
anticipation) that they were to receive the subsidy in the future. We then
move on to compare work participation and time allocation across treatment
and control areas before and after the program. Finally, we take a look at
socioeconomic determinants of education and work choices in the absence of
the program.
A. Data Collection
In December 2001, a consortium formed by the Institute for Fiscal Studies
and partners in Colombia—a research institute (Econometria) and a data col-
lection firm (SEI)—began to work on the evaluation of the FA program. For
political reasons, random allocation of the program was not feasible, so instead
it was decided to construct a representative stratified sample of treatment
municipalities and to choose control municipalities among those that belonged
to the same strata but that were excluded from the program.4 The 25 strata
were determined by region and an index of infrastructure relating to health
and education. The control towns were chosen, within the same stratum, to
be as similar as possible to each of the treatment towns in terms of population,
area, and an index of quality of life. Control areas satisfied most of the criteria
for eligibility, with the exception of the presence of a bank. The final evaluation
4
Randomization was not feasible because the program was intended as one way of alleviating the
effects of the deep recession that affected Colombia in 2000–2001, and it was therefore deemed
important to deliver the program in the largest number of municipalities possible in the shortest
possible time frame. Moreover, the government was keen to develop the program quickly as the
presidential elections were approaching.
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sample is made up of 122 municipalities, 57 of which are treatment and 65
of which are controls.5
In each municipality we randomly sampled approximately 100 eligible
households for inclusion in the evaluation sample. We ended up with a sample
of around 11,500 households that were interviewed between June and October
2002. Between July and November 2003 (the second wave) we succeeded in
recontacting and obtaining complete interviews from 10,742 households, rep-
resenting around 94% of the original sample.6 The first data collection was
scheduled to take place before the program started in the treatment munic-
ipalities, to provide a baseline survey to control for any systematic preprogram
differences between treatment and control towns. Unfortunately, political pres-
sure resulted in the program starting in 26 out of 57 treatment municipalities
before the fieldwork commenced.7 In what follows we refer to the munici-
palities in which the program started early as “early-treat” areas and the
remainder as “late-treat” areas.8 This means that both surveys in early-treat
areas took place when the program was already under way; in late-treat areas
it was under way at the time of the second survey, although knowledge of it
was widespread at the time of the first survey and registration had even begun.
Thus school enrollment at the first survey is directly affected either by the
program (early treat) or by the knowledge that it was to be received in the
near future (late treat). For these reasons, retrospective information on school
enrollment was collected in the first survey, so as to provide a baseline free
of contamination for the evaluation. It was not feasible to collect data on time
use retrospectively, however, although we are less concerned about anticipation
effects along this dimension, as unlike school enrollment, child labor was not
subject to any conditionality. Thus, our baselines for the school enrollment
and time use analyses refer to different periods: for the school enrollment
analysis, we use retrospective data collected at the first survey, and for the
time use analysis we use data collected at the first survey.
The surveys contain detailed information on a wide range of individual and
household characteristics, including the household sociodemographic structure,
5
Budgetary considerations prevented there from being more than 122 municipalities in the eval-
uation sample. To take into account possible correlations within these clusters, standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level throughout the analysis.
6
Note that a third survey was completed in April 2006, although it is not used in this study.
7
Program officials stated repeatedly to the evaluation team that which municipalities started first
was a random process determined by the order in which the paperwork had been administered in
the central office.
8
Throughout the paper, “treatment” is used to refer to both early-treat and late-treat areas taken
together.
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dwelling conditions, household assets, household member education levels,
use of health care services, children’s and mother’s anthropometric indicators,
household consumption, labor supply, income, and transfers. In addition, in-
formation on the municipality infrastructure, wages, and food prices was col-
lected by administering questionnaires to well-informed town authorities and
through visits to local markets.
B. Characteristics across Treatment and Control Areas in the First Survey
The evaluation methodology and thus the credibility of the results (both of
which we come back to in more detail in Secs. IV and V), ultimately rest on
the choice of an appropriate comparison group on the basis of which to
construct the counterfactual. This is because our evaluation methodology is
based on a comparison of outcomes before and after the program in the towns
that received it, with the same outcomes in a set of towns that did not receive
it, but that was chosen to be similar along many observed dimensions. Con-
ditional on this, the underlying assumption of our approach is that there are
no unobserved differences between areas that affect outcomes.
Table A1 in the appendix presents average values of observed municipality
characteristics in treatment and control areas at the time of the first survey.
Most characteristics are not statistically different from each other between the
two areas; while some variables relating to service delivery differ, such as a
lower number of hospitals and small health care centers in control areas, it
should be noted that this is due to the smaller populations on average in
control municipalities. We should point out, in any case, that later on we
correct for the imbalance using propensity score matching. We will provide
more information on the balancing between control and treatment areas of
the whole set of household and individual characteristics in Section IV.
C. School Enrollment across Treatment and Control Areas
A key aim of the study is to evaluate the effects of the program on school
choices. As this relies on comparing school outcomes between treatment and
control areas, an important issue is the extent to which their school choices
before the program started are comparable. As discussed in Section III.A,
school enrollment data were collected retrospectively at the time of the first
survey, and these data constitute our baseline data. School enrollment is defined
on the basis of whether the child is registered at school in the academic year
corresponding to the survey. Table 1 provides a comparison of school enrollment
rates across late-treat, early-treat, and control areas, for three periods: baseline,
first survey, and second survey, separately for relatively more urbanized and
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TABLE 1
ENROLLMENT RATES IN TREATMENT AND CONTROL AREAS IN BASELINE,
FIRST AND SECOND SURVEYS (%)
Late Treat Early Treat Control
Rural 14–16:
Baseline 52.74 55.13 45.96
Survey 1 58.48 58.91 42.36
Survey 2 65.67 71.23 53.16
Rural 8–13:
Baseline 85.80 89.74 82.41
Survey 1 91.68 92.92 83.20
Survey 2 92.92 94.04 87.91
Urban 14–16:
Baseline 70.11 80.56 67.74
Survey 1 75.26 82.94 67.61
Survey 2 82.18 88.50 75.88
Urban 8–13:
Baseline 90.28 94.93 90.36
Survey 1 95.23 95.15 90.31
Survey 2 96.82 97.26 93.32
Note. Baseline data refer to a preprogram period; survey 1 data relate to a
period during which the program was in place for early-treat but not late-
treat areas; survey 2 data relate to a postprogram period for all treatment
areas.
relatively more rural areas,9 and for 8–13- and 14–16-year-olds.10 These groups
are chosen on the basis of the sharp reduction in school enrollment in Colombia
at age 14 observed in our data.
There are a couple of points to take from the table, both of which highlight
the importance of controlling for preprogram enrollment in evaluating the
effects of the program on school choices, but for different reasons. The first
is that there appear to be preprogram differences in school enrollment in
treatment and control areas before the program: school enrollment in control
areas is generally lower than in treatment areas. The second is that one cannot
rule out the possibility of anticipation effects: increases in school enrollment
9
From here on, we use the terms “urban” and “rural” for simplicity. “Urban” refers to the cabecera
municipal of the rural municipality. This is the center of government in each particular municipality,
and it is expected to have at least 3,000 inhabitants and to have various public facilities, including
a city hall, a school, and a health center, among other public buildings. “Rural” refers to the more
remote parts of the municipality.
10
As the baseline data are collected retrospectively from individuals aged 7 through 17 at the first
survey, we do not observe the enrollment rates of individuals who were 17 years old at the baseline
(because they were 18 at the first survey), so the upper age cut-off in table 1 is 16. We also omit
7-year-olds because in practice many children do not start school until age 7: remember we are
considering as an outcome variable school enrollment in the academic years corresponding to the
survey, and a child who is 7 years old at the time of a survey may have been 6 at the start of the
academic year corresponding to that survey and, hence, may not yet have actually started school.
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between the baseline and the first survey are observed in treatment areas but
not in control areas.
Another point worth noting from the table is that even though school
enrollment in treatment areas is higher than in control areas after the program,
it is not clear that the increase in school enrollment from before to after the
program is higher in treatment areas: for the late-treat/control comparison, it
depends on to the extent to which we believe that late-treat enrollment rates
in the first survey (i.e., before the program started in these areas) reflect
anticipation effects, that is, are contaminated by the program. We return to
this in Section IV.
D. Work Participation and Time Allocation in Treatment and Control Areas
We carry out the same exercise for participation in different types of work,
as well as for the amounts of time spent in work and school, although we do
not observe these latter outcomes retrospectively (owing to the difficulty in
obtaining accurate retrospective information on these outcomes). As this means
that we have no preprogram data on these for early-treat areas, we exclude
them from the time use analysis. In table 2, we show participation in income-
generating work11 and domestic work, at the extensive and intensive margins,
before and after the program, in late-treat and control areas. Time allocation
is measured in hours and fractions thereof and relates to the day before the
interview.12 Note that we have no information on time use for children younger
than 10.
In line with the descriptive statistics relating to school enrollment, children
in control and late-treat areas differ also in their time allocation before the
program, as shown in table 2. In particular, most children in late-treat areas
participate more in income-generating and domestic activities before the pro-
gram (with the exception of rural 14–17-year-olds) and go to school for fewer
hours, compared to children in control areas. This is in contrast to what we
observed for school enrollment, which is higher in late-treat than in control
areas before the program.
Relating to the period after the program, we see that first, work participation
in late-treat areas is generally lower than before the program (with the ex-
11
This pools together work in the labor market and the family business, due to the very low
employment rates of children in the labor market, particularly of those aged 10–13, whose par-
ticipation in labor market at the baseline is around 2.7%.
12
We drop children interviewed on a Sunday or a Monday, as their time use refers to a Saturday
or Sunday, respectively, which are not regular school days. This leads to the loss of 24.2% and
20.7% of 10–17-year-old children, at the first and second survey, respectively. This selection is
based on the timing of interviews, which is independent of household characteristics and choices.
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TABLE 2
PARTICIPATION IN AND TIME ALLOCATED (IN HOURS PER DAY) TO ACTIVITIES IN LATE-TREAT AND
CONTROL AREAS BEFORE AND AFTER THE PROGRAM
Before After
Late Treat Control Late Treat Control
Rural 14–17:
Participation in income-generating ac-
tivities (%) 14.85 14.91 18.71 19.22
Participation in domestic work (%) 70.58 64.28 65.49 61.31
Hours of income-generating work 1.04 1.03 1.45 1.45
Hours of domestic work 2.59 2.23 2.12 2.04
Hours of school 1.77 2.31 2.61 2.28
Rural 10–13:
Participation in income-generating ac-
tivities (%) 4.79 2.97 4.73 3.59
Participation in domestic work 69.76 61.93 65.66 66.01
Hours of income-generating work .24 .15 .22 .23
Hours of domestic work 1.93 1.41 1.34 1.46
Hours of school 2.27 3.49 4.20 3.69
Urban 14–17:
Participation in income-generating ac-
tivities (%) 13.16 7.94 12.94 11.89
Participation in domestic work 69.08 57.40 60.91 56.83
Hours of income-generating work .83 .49 .75 .84
Hours of domestic work 2.08 1.23 1.20 1.18
Hours of school 1.13 3.18 3.46 3.25
Urban 10–13:
Participation in income-generating ac-
tivities (%) 4.20 1.59 3.08 2.23
Participation in domestic work (%) 69.29 51.91 61.53 56.40
Hours of income-generating work .20 .05 .14 .11
Hours of domestic work 1.59 .84 .88 .85
Hours of school 1.20 3.76 4.23 4.06
Note. The period before (after) the program refers to the first (second) survey. Note that statistics
relating to hours are not conditional on participation in that activity.
ception of rural 14–17-year-olds), in contrast to control areas in which it is
generally higher. Second, time spent at school tends to increase more in late-
treat than in control areas. Third, time spent at domestic work generally
decreases by more in late-treat than in control areas for all groups. Finally,
time spent at income-generating work generally decreases in late-treat areas,
whereas it increases in control areas. All of this evidence is consistent with
there being desirable effects of the program on child time allocation: in Section
IV we go on to the causal analysis of the effects.
E. Determinants of School Enrollment and Work Participation
As noted already, observing as much information as possible about the mu-
nicipalities and households in our sample is important to the quasi-experi-
mental evaluation set-up. It allows us not only to balance treatment and control
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areas, so as to ensure that we are comparing like with like, but also to improve
the precision of the estimated effects. The importance of such characteristics
for education and work choices in various developing countries has been well
established (e.g., Grootaert and Kanbur 1995; Jensen and Nielsen 1997; Pa-
trinos and Psacharopoulos 1997; Ray 2000). Here we provide a summary of
their relative importance in choices in the Colombian context that underlies
our analysis.
We estimate a probit model for school enrollment and work participation
across individuals aged 8 (10 for work) through 17. We use the data from
the first survey only, and for this reason we omit early-treat areas, as the relative
importance of determinants in this period may be contaminated by the ex-
istence of the program in these areas. We control for all of the variables listed
in tables A1 and A2 in the appendix, and show the effects of those of particular
interest in table 3.
Turning to the effects for school enrollment, shown in column 1 of table
3, we see that females are more likely to be enrolled in school than males,
contrary to what is observed in Mexico (Skoufias and Parker 2001). The effects
of parental education are in line with previous results in the literature on
educational choices: higher education levels are associated with a higher prob-
ability of school enrollment, and this is particularly so for the education level
of the spouse, who is most usually the child’s mother. The effect of the child
wage, which is the average of all observed child wages in the municipality,
is negative, as expected, but not statistically different from zero. The distance
to the nearest school, which is a proxy for the cost of going to school, decreases
participation in school.
Turning to participation in work, columns 2 and 3 show that females are
less frequently involved in income-generating activities compared to males
but are more likely to undertake domestic work. In general, the effects of
other variables are less noteworthy than for school enrollment decisions, al-
though this may be partly due to the lower sample sizes and resulting decrease
in precision. The effect of the spouse’s education is less strong, and even
though it decreases the likelihood of participation in income-generating work,
it has no significant effect on domestic work. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
number of schools in the urban part of the municipality significantly decreases
the incidence of domestic work, as do high child wages.
IV. Evaluating the Impact of Familias en Accio´n on School and Work
We estimate the effect of the program on school and work participation at
both the extensive and intensive margins, using a difference-in-differences
methodology combined with matching. After controlling for observables, this
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TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND WORK PARTICIPATION AT THE FIRST SURVEY,
LATE TREAT, AND CONTROL
Regressors
School
Enrollment
(1)
Income-
Generating
Work
(2)
Domestic
Work
(3)
Female child .0503
(.0068)**
.0658
(.0061)**
.2197
(.0140)**
Household owns house .0145
(.0243)
.0048
(.0083)
.0055
(.0139)
Distance to nearest school .0006
(.0003)*
.0001
(.0002)
.0001
(.0003)
Education level head:
Incomplete primary .0206
(.0091)*
.0031
(.0070)
.0120
(.0143)
Complete primary .0345
(.0116)**
.0071
(.0084)
.0257
(.0241)
Incomplete secondary .0675
(.0126)**
.0192
(.0129)
.0563
(.0289)
Complete secondary  .0653
(.0159)**
.0030
(.0227)
.0898
(.0480)
Education level spouse:
Incomplete primary .0296
(.0093)**
.0090
(.0068)
.0020
(.0207)
Complete primary .0642
(.0096)**
.0216
(.0096)*
.0208
(.0248)
Incomplete secondary .0766
(.0097)**
.0241
(.0106)*
.0595
(.0335)
Complete secondary  .0940
(.0085)**
.0385
(.0146)**
.0234
(.0432)
Municipality variables:
Number of urban schools .0001
(.0014)
.0020
(.0017)
.0104
(.0033)**
Number of rural schools .0006
(.0003)*
.0004
(.0002)
.0009
(.0007)
Average municipality monthly child wage .0041
(.0105)
.0027
(.0089)
.0658
(.0240)**
Observations 12,691 7,885 7,883
Note. We also control for variables listed in tables A1 and A2 of the appendix. The sample size for
work participation is lower than that for school enrollment, due to the fact that only 11,117 children are
aged 10 or above, and of these, one-quarter are interviewed on Sunday or Monday and are therefore
dropped from the sample. The few remaining ones are due to missing or inconsistent responses. For
school enrollment (work), sample comprises 8(10)–17-year-olds at the first survey in late-treat and control
areas. Note that average municipality monthly income is the average across the working children in the
municipality.
* Denotes statistical significance at the 1%–5% level.
** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level or less.
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is essentially the difference between outcomes before and after the program
in treated areas, adjusted by the change experienced by the control group over
the same period, to account for time trends that are unrelated to the program.
Identifying the program effect using this approach assumes that there are no
unobserved factors affecting outcomes differentially in treated and control
areas.13 As we observe and control for detailed household- and municipality-
level information, much of our concern about omitted variable bias is alleviated.
However, the assumption that time trends are the same in treated and
control areas needs to be further examined. While this assumption cannot be
tested, it is useful to compare trends in school enrollment between treatment
and control areas before the program started. If it is the case that they are
similar, it is likely that they would have been the same in the posttreatment
period in the absence of the program. We test this using data from the
Colombian Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) of 1990, 1995, and 2000,
all of which are preprogram periods. One problem, however, is that we observe
very few of our control municipalities in the DHS, so the test is likely to be
sensitive to this. For this reason, we also present the trends using as controls
all municipalities that did not go on to receive the treatment.14 This increases
our sample size, although at the cost of introducing a relatively more hetero-
geneous set of control municipalities.15 Given this, it is likely to represent
the worst case scenario. We condition on SISBEN level 1 households (i.e.,
households that would be eligible for the program), and we control for the
same set of household-level regressors as in the evaluation. Results in table 4
show that in neither case can we statistically reject the hypothesis that the
preprogram year dummies (and hence time trends) are the same for treatment
and nontreatment areas at the 5% level of statistical significance. This evidence
is reassuring, although we should acknowledge that some doubt remains re-
garding preprogram trends in the actual treatment and control areas.
Further reassuring evidence that control and treatment areas displayed sim-
ilar trends in the preprogram period is the fact that the evolution of per capita
household labor income (observed retrospectively in our survey) in treatment
and control areas in the 3 years 1999, 2000, and 2001 is very similar in
13
With a linear model, one can allow for different unobserved factors in treated and control areas,
as long as they are fixed over time and additive, as their effects would be purged in the linear
difference-in-difference estimation. However, our estimation is nonlinear and so this no longer
holds.
14
The DHS does not contain all of the municipalities that are in the Familias survey we use.
When we restrict the sample to SISBEN level 1 (would-be eligible) households, between 5% and
8% of surveyed households in the DHS, we observe 13 treatment municipalities in 1990, 21 in
1995, and 19 in 2000. We observe 8 control municipalities in 1990, 2 in 1995, and 2 in 2000.
15
We observe 28 nontreatment municipalities in 1990, 23 in 1995, and 22 in 2000.
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TABLE 4
PREPROGRAM TIME TRENDS IN SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IN TREATMENT
AND NONTREATMENT AREAS
(1) (2)
Treatment area .0117
(.0756)
.0865
(.0624)
Year p 1995 .1770
(.1697)
.0002
(.0822)
Year p 2000 .0646
(.0940)
.0742
(.0928)
Treatment area # Year p 1995 .3237
(.1764)
.1481
(.0952)
Treatment area # Year p 2000 .0149
(.1016)
.0007
(.0995)
Number of observations 1,441 1,876
Note. 1990 is the reference year. Column 1 includes as control mu-
nicipalities a subset of those used in the evaluation; col. 2 includes as
control municipalities all municipalities sampled in DHS that did not
go on to become treated. Standard errors, clustered at municipality
level, in parentheses. We control for a similar set of regressors as in
table A2 of the appendix.
treatment and control areas prior to the program (table A3 in the appendix).
Although this relates to a nonoutcome variable, it is not inconsistent with
our common trends assumption, which is encouraging.
Moreover, the assumption of common time effects is likely to be violated
if individuals living in treatment areas change behavior in anticipation of the
program. This would mean that outcomes in treatment areas in the period
before the program would not be representative of outcomes in treatment
areas in the absence of the program. To minimize this possibility, we use
school enrollment data from two years before the program as our baseline.
A. School Enrollment
To evaluate the effect of the program on school enrollment, we use retrospective
data on enrollment collected at the time of the first survey as our measure of
preprogram, or baseline, enrollment. This is because, as discussed in Section
III.A, the program had already started in early-treat areas at the time of the
first survey; in late-treat areas, even though the program had not started,
knowledge of it was widespread and registration had begun for some indi-
viduals. It turns out that such anticipation effects are important.
The specification that we use to estimate the effects of the program on
enrollment is
2
Y p a  a 1.(t p j)  a P  a Ait 0 1j 2 3
jp1
′
 a T  v Z  u , (1)4 it it
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for , 1, and 2. The baseline is , is the first survey (preprogramt p 0 t p 0 t p 1
for late treat and postprogram for early treat), and is the second surveyt p 2
(postprogram for all treated areas). The 1.( ) notation denotes that the variable
has a value of one if the condition in parentheses holds and zero otherwise.
The rest of the notation is defined as follows: Yit p 1 if individual i is enrolled
in school in period t and 0 otherwise; P p 1 for late treat p 1 or early treat
p 1 and 0 otherwise; A p 1 for late treat p 1 and t p 1 and 0 otherwise;
T p 1 for (P p 1 and t p 2) or (early treat p 1 and t p 1) and 0 otherwise;
and Zit is a set of preprogram individual, household, and area characteristics.
The above specification is estimated using individuals who are aged 8–17
at the time of the second survey and who are observed in both the first and
second surveys. The effect of the program, estimated separately for 8–13- and
14–17-year-olds in urban and rural areas, is given by a4.
16 Note that a3
estimates the anticipation effect in late-treat areas at the first survey. We assume
throughout that and estimate equation (1) using a probit2u ∼ IN(0, a )it
model.
One criticism of the parametric specification is that extrapolation beyond
the region of “common support,” that is, the region over which treated in-
dividuals have a counterpart in the group of controls, can lead to misleading
inferences. To address this concern, we first match treatment and control
observations using kernel-weighted propensity score matching, and impose
common support by dropping 10% of the treatment observations at which
the propensity score density of the control observations is the lowest.
Tables A5–A8 in the appendix show that characteristics of the matched
treatment and control samples are more similar than those of the unmatched
samples, across all four groups. While a few significant differences between
the treated and controls remain in the matched sample, this should be weighed
up against the fact that we consider a very detailed set of variables. Note,
moreover, that in the small number of cases in which there are significant
differences, it is generally with respect to variables that are insignificant in
the propensity score estimation. We also see from the tables that matching
improves substantially the overall quality of the comparison, as shown by both
the reduction in the mean and median absolute standardized biases by around
50% for each of the groups, and the decrease in the Pseudo R2 of the probit
model for the selection of treated households.
16
Note that in a different specification we allowed for the treatment impact to differ depending
on the treatment duration, as early-treat areas at the time of the second survey have been receiving
the program for a longer period of time than late-treat areas at the second survey or than early-
treat areas at baseline. However, we found no evidence of the program impacts varying with length
of exposure to the treatment.
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TABLE 5
EFFECT OF PROGRAM ON SCHOOL ENROLLMENT, PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING
Rural 14–17 Rural 8–13 Urban 14–17 Urban 8–13
Effect .0693*
(.0311)
.0223
(.0241)
.0331
(.0257)
.0056
(.0181)
N 1,873 3,648 1,439 2,579
Note. Coefficients are estimated using propensity score matching using a difference-in-differences
approach. Age denotes age at the second survey. Common support is imposed by dropping 10%
of treatment observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the
minimum propensity score of the controls. Bootstrapped standard errors, based on 250 replications,
are in parentheses. We control for variables listed in tables A1 and A2 of the appendix.
* Denotes statistical significance at the 1%–5% level.
TABLE 6
MARGINAL EFFECT OF PROGRAM ON SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND ANTICIPATION EFFECTS, PROBIT MODEL
Probit Model Rural 14–17 Rural 8–13 Urban 14–17 Urban 8–13
Treated (a4) .0662
(.0232)**
.0282
(.0111)**
.0470
(.0123)**
.0140
(.0066)*
Anticipation (a3) .0631
(.0291)**
.0149
(.0144)
.0300
(.0193)
.0242
(.0057)**
N 1,873 3,648 1,439 2,579
Note. Marginal effects are estimated from a probit model using eq. (1). N is the number of treated
individuals falling within the common support in the postprogram period. Standard errors, clustered at
the municipality level, are in parentheses. Control for variables listed in tables A1 and A2 of the appendix.
* Denotes statistical significance at the 1%–5% level.
** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level or less.
We next estimate the effects of the program on individuals who fall within
the common support using difference-in-differences propensity score matching.
This exercise is carried out in order to provide a benchmark for comparison
with the parametric specification. We see from this, in table 5, that the program
increased school enrollment, particularly of older children, although the effects
are imprecisely estimated.
To increase efficiency, we estimate equation (1) parametrically, again using
a difference-in-difference approach. To minimize any extrapolation bias within
the parametric specification, we restrict the analysis to individuals who lie
within the common support, as determined using the methods described above.
One caveat is that this means that we cannot infer anything about the impact
of the program on individuals who fall outside the common support, who are
often the ones who benefit most from it. Note, however, that the estimates
obtained when we do not restrict the sample to those within the common
support are in fact very similar (shown in table A4 of the appendix). Table 6
presents the results from estimating equation (1). Similar to table 5, it shows
that the program had positive and significant impacts on school enrollment,
especially for older age groups, of just under 7 percentage points in rural areas
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and around 5 percentage points in urban areas. It had a lower effect, of just
under 3 percentage points, on the enrollment rates of young children in rural
areas, and an effect of just over 1 percentage point for young children in urban
areas. Comparing tables 4 and 5, we see that the estimates of the effects are
fairly similar across econometric specifications, although they are more precisely
estimated in the parametric one. Table 6 also shows that late-treat areas en-
rollment rates were already contaminated by the program even before it was
implemented (marginal impact a3). This underlines the importance of col-
lecting data well in advance of when programs start, so as to have a clean
baseline for evaluation.
B. Time Allocation
We have seen in the previous section that the program has been effective in
its main objective: contributing to human capital accumulation via increasing
enrollment in school. This increased participation in school must come at the
expense of some other activities that the child was formerly engaged in, whether
work or leisure related. Indeed, the short-term effects on children’s welfare of
increased school enrollment depend on whether the CCT program reduced
time spent by children in work-related activities, vis-a`-vis affecting leisure
time. Moreover, the effect of the program on the child’s contribution to
household labor income, and thus on the immediate welfare of the household,
can be gauged somewhat by considering the extent to which involvement in
income-generating work was affected by the program. However, it is worth
bearing in mind that children attending school spend, on average, 5.5 hours
in school per day17 and that it takes just under 15 minutes on average for
children to reach school (table A2). With school days being relatively short,
increased school participation need not imply reduced work participation.
We use detailed time use data from before and after the program to assess
how the program has affected the amounts of time spent by children in work
activities as well as at school. As discussed in Section III, there are no ret-
rospective data on this outcome. This means that we have no preprogram
information on time use for early-treat areas, given that they were already
receiving the program by the time the first survey was collected. We thus
have no way of controlling for fundamental differences in time use between
early-treat and control areas, and for this reason we chose to exclude early-
treat areas from all of the analysis that follows.
17
The school day in Colombia is relatively short and does not incorporate breaks. Moreover, it is
not uncommon for schools to offer two short schedules to different pupils on the same day to
facilitate demand.
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There is still the concern that we cannot estimate separately how much of
the difference in time allocation between late-treat and control areas at the
time of the first survey is due to fundamental differences in time uses between
the two areas and how much is due to late-treat individuals changing behavior
in anticipation of the program. However, if anticipation effects in work choices
exist, our estimates of the effect of the program on child time allocations
would represent lower bounds on the actual effects, assuming that individuals
reduce participation in work in anticipation of the program, an assumption
that is consistent with the overall treatment effects we go on estimate. To
further alleviate our concerns, we control for retrospective school enrollment
(the baseline for the school enrollment analysis), although the results are not
sensitive to omitting it from the set of regressors. Therefore, we are fairly
confident that the data collected in the first survey are sufficient to capture
fundamental differences in time uses.
In the analysis that follows, we consider income-generating activities (i.e.,
labor market and family business activities) both separately from and together
with domestic activities. The groups that we consider are the same as in
Section IV.B, apart from a higher cut-off of age 10 for the younger groups,
as time use information is not collected from children younger than this.
To ascertain whether participation in various activities changed due to the
program, we first use the time allocation data to construct binary indicators
of participation in different activities, denoted j, which may be income-gen-
erating activities, domestic work, total work (which pools the two previous
activities), or school. For each group, we use data from the first and second
surveys, across late-treat and control areas, to estimate the following equation:
jP p b  b 1.(t p 2)  b (late treat)it 0j 1j 2j
′
 b T  w Z  u , (2)3j it it
where if individual i spends a positive amount of time in activity jjP p 1it
on the day before the interview in period t and 0 otherwise; and T p 1 for
late treat p 1 and t p 2 and 0 otherwise.
All other variables are as defined in Section IV.A. As our outcome variable
is discrete, we estimate equation (2) using a probit model, for each of the
activities listed above. The results are shown in table 7.
We see from column 1 that the program had no significant impact on
participation in income-generating activities. The effects of the program on
participation in domestic work are much larger, as can be seen from column
2. The program decreased participation in domestic work of both old and
young children in urban areas by just under 10 and 13 percentage points,
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TABLE 7
IMPACT OF THE PROGRAM ON PARTICIPATION IN DIFFERENT ACTIVITIES
Participation In:
Income-
Generating
Work
(1)
Domestic
Work
(2)
All Work
(3) p (1) & (2)
Rural 14–17:
Marginal effect .0005 .0312 .0040
(.0259) (.0421) (.0402)
N 789 791 789
Participation w subsidy (%) 18.71 65.49 80.66
Rural 10–13:
Marginal effect .0093 .0638 .0744
(.0095) (.0496) (.0484)
N 1,034 1,057 1,057
Participation w subsidy (%) 4.73 65.66 68.97
Urban 14–17:
Marginal effect .0362 .0967 .1499
(.0198) (.0436)* (.0443)**
N 570 571 571
Participation w subsidy (%) 12.94 60.91 69.28
Urban 10–13:
Marginal effect .0091 .1290 .1417
(.0063) (.0483)** (.0489)**
N 723 745 745
Participation w subsidy (%) 3.08 61.53 62.87
Note. Marginal effects are estimated using eq. (2). N is the number of treated individuals in the
second period. Standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Control for
variables listed in tables A1 and A2 of the appendix. “Participation w subsidy” is the average par-
ticipation of each group in treated area after the program.
* Denotes statistical significance at the 1%–5% level.
** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level or less.
respectively. These imply corresponding counterfactual participation rates of
just under 71% and above 74% compared to the observed postprogram rates
of just under 61% and 62% for old and young children, respectively.
To sum up, we see in column 3 that the program significantly reduced
participation in work in urban areas only.18 This suggests that participation
of children in income-generating activities or domestic work responds less to
the program in rural than in urban areas, which is perhaps not surprising if
children are important labor inputs in agriculture and there is greater flexibility
in hours worked for children in this sector.
However, this analysis ignores intensity of work activity, which is the more
important margin from both welfare and income-generating viewpoints. More-
18
Note that participation in income-generating activities and participation in domestic work are
not mutually exclusive, so the participation rate in work (either domestic work or income-generating
activity) is lower than the sum of the two.
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over, if the FA subsidy is not sufficient to replace fully forgone child income,
we may expect to observe larger impacts at the intensive rather than at the
extensive margin. We estimate the impact of the program on the amount of
time allocated to each activity using the following specification:
jh p g  g 1.(t p 2)  g (late treat)it 0j 1j 2j
′
 g T  v Z  u , (3)3j it it
where denotes the amount of time (in hours and fractions thereof ) spentjhit
by individual i in activity j in period t and all other variables are as previously
defined. We estimate equation (3) for each activity using a tobit model, to
account for the fact that the dependent variable is censored at zero for indi-
viduals who report that they do not spend any time in activity j.
The results are shown in table 8. For each activity, we report both the
estimated coefficient, which is the discrete change in the latent dependent
variable as a result of the program, and the marginal effect, which represents
the average increase in time allocated to a particular activity if a household
receives the program.19 To assess the magnitude of these effects, we also report
the average number of hours supplied after the program by children in treated
areas. The main message to emerge from table 8 is that the program increased
significantly the amount of time spent in school for all children and decreased
time at work for almost all groups.
The magnitudes of the impacts, however, are very different across groups:
the estimated impact is largest for young children in urban areas, who spend
around 4.5 hours more per day in school after the program compared to their
counterparts in control areas. Time at school also increases substantially after
the program for urban children aged 14–17, by 3.8 hours as shown in table
8, as well as for rural children aged 10–13, by 2.5 hours. For children aged
14–17 in rural areas, however, the effect of the program on the number of
hours at school, although low, at around 1 hour, is statistically different from
zero at conventional levels. Their time spent at work is not significantly reduced
by the program, which as noted already may be indicative of inelastic child
labor supply in rural areas.
Another important point to take from this table is that when the program
has significant impacts on times at school and at work, the increased time at
school is not wholly substituted by reduced time at work. For children aged
14–17 living in urban areas and for children aged 10–13 in rural areas, more
than one-quarter of the increase in time spent at school comes out of time
19
In contrast to the estimate , this effect takes into account the nonlinearity of the dependentg3j
variable.
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TABLE 8
IMPACT OF THE PROGRAM ON HOURS OF CHILD TIME USES
Hours Spent At:
Income-Generating
Work
(1)
Domestic
Work
(2)
All Work
(3)
School
(4)
Rural 14–17:
Coefficient .06 .52 .39 2.22
(1.09) (.30) (.33) (.93)*
Marginal effect .01 .33 .31 .96
(.14) (.18) (.26) (.46)*
No. hours with subsidy 1.5 2.1 3.6 2.6
Rural 10–13:
Coefficient 2.18 .90 1.04 3.13
— (.31)** (.30)** (.84)**
Marginal effect .04 .54 .64 2.48
— (.18)** (.18)** (.61)**
No. hours with subsidy .2 1.3 1.6 4.2
Urban 14–17:
Coefficient 3.34 1.19 1.78 5.21
(1.66)* (.27)** (.33)** (.87)**
Marginal effect .22 .61 1.03 3.79
(.09)* (.13)** (.18)** (.72)**
No. hours with subsidy .8 1.2 2.0 3.5
Urban 10–13:
Coefficient 3.07 1.11 1.29 5.09
— (.25)** (.25)** (.88)**
Marginal effect .03 .54 .64 4.49
— (.10)** (.10)** (.78)**
No. hours with subsidy .1 .9 1.0 4.2
Note. (1) The coefficients and marginal effects are estimated parametrically using eq. (3), controlling
for the variables in tables A1 and A2 of the appendix, as well as for an indicator of retrospective school
enrollment from the first survey. Treatment areas include late-treat only. Bootstrapped standard errors
based on 200 replications, adjusted for clustering at the municipality level, are in parentheses. “No.
hours with subsidy” is the average number of hours provided by each group in treated areas in the
period after the program. (2) For children aged 10–13 years, it was not possible to bootstrap the standard
errors of the impacts of the program on hours spent in income-generating activities due to the very low
number of positive outcomes. For this reason we do not report standard errors for thesegroups.However,
on the basis of very large nonclustered standard errors (likely to be inflated even more after adjusting
for clustering), we can say that the effects are not statistically different from zero.
* Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level or less.
** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level or less.
that would otherwise have been spent on work activities. However, in urban
areas, substitution effects are much smaller for younger children, as less than
one-seventh of the increase in their time spent at school comes out of time at
work. These effects are quite different from the results found in Mexico where,
for boys in particular, the reductions in work participation are approximately
equivalent to the increases in school participation (Skoufias and Parker 2001).20
20
For girls, however, the reductions in work participation tend to be lower than the increases in
school participation.
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Moreover, most of the substitution relates to domestic work, as time spent
at income-generating activities does not change significantly after the program,
except for children aged 14–17 in urban areas. However, the magnitude of
the impact is small, as the program decreases their time spent at income-
generating activities by around 0.2 hours. This suggests that the leisure time
of children decreased slightly after the program, although we have no direct
information on this to substantiate this claim. It also suggests that the con-
tribution of children to total household labor income may not have decreased
much due to the low impacts of the program on child labor supply.
V. Conclusion
In this study we have evaluated the effects of an ongoing large-scale welfare
program in Colombia, Familias en Accio´n, on school and work participation
of children. We find that the program increased the school participation rates
of 14–17-year-old children quite substantially, by between around 5 and 7
percentage points, to reach enrollment of 64% and 82% in rural and urban
areas, respectively. It also had nonnegligible effects on the enrollment of youn-
ger children, of between 1.3 and 2.8 percentage points, despite their already
high participation rates in the absence of the program, at between 91% and
96%. In our analysis of the effects at the intensive margin, we found that the
effects are larger in urban areas, where school attendance goes up by between
3.8 hours per day for older children and 4.5 hours per day for younger children,
compared to 1 hour for older rural children and 2.5 hours for younger rural
children.
The effects on domestic work participation are largest in urban areas, where
participation is around 10 and 13 percentage points lower after the program,
at 61% and 62% for older and younger children, respectively. Time spent at
work (mainly domestic work) was reduced by less than the increase in time
spent at school. These results suggest that parents are substituting other uses
of their children’s time, such as leisure, and are not using the conditional
subsidy to replace fully the earnings from their children’s work. The largest
substitution effects are observed for children aged 14–17 in urban areas and
for children aged 10–13 in rural areas, for whom more than one-quarter of
the increase in time spent at school comes out of time that would otherwise
have been spent on work activities. As there is very little evidence that the
program in Colombia decreased significantly the time spent by children in
income-generating activities, it seems unlikely that household income has been
negatively affected through this channel.
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Appendix
TABLE A1
CHARACTERISTICS OF TREATMENT AND CONTROL MUNICIPALITIES
Treatment Control
Proportion of households with piped water .88 (.14) .88 (.13)
Proportion of households with sewage facilities .56 (.36) .62 (.36)
Urban population in 2001 15,935 (2,373) 13,218 (2,110)
Rural population in 2001 14,630 (1,185) 10,254 (1,389)*
Altitude 729.57 (773) 810.83 (885)
No. of urban public schools 8.70 (8.18) 6.69 (8.33)
No. of rural public schools 42.89 (29.82) 25.55 (23.44)*
No. of students per teacher 22.15 (5.04) 21.83 (5.72)
Class m2 per student 2.97 (2.58) 2.75 (1.92)
Number of hospitals in 2002 .82 (.38) .64 (.48)*
Number of health care centers in 2002 .89 (1.13) .81 (1.14)
Number of small health care centers in 2002 5.15 (4.26) 3.29 (4.99)*
Number of pharmacies in 2002 9.77 (7.43) 6.53 (6.14)*
Proportion of municipalities where a health
care provider employee deserted in 2001 .12 (.33) .06 (.24)
Proportion of municipalities with a strike in
health care providers in 2001 .32 (.47) .16 (.37)*
Region of residence:
Atlantic .33 (.48) .29 (.46)
Oriental .25 (.43) .31 (.47)
Central .30 (.46) .29 (.46)
Pacific .12 (.33) .11 (.31)
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. A * indicates that variable is statistically different across
treatment and control areas (based on t-tests at the 5% level of significance).
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TABLE A2
SUMMARY OF MEAN CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS LATE-TREAT, EARLY-TREAT, AND
CONTROL AREAS AT THE FIRST SURVEY
Late Treat SD Early Treat SD Control SD
Age of child 11.084 2.908 11.22 2.91 11.17 2.9
Child is female .476 .499 .475 .499 .466 .499
Health insurance of head:
Unsubsidized .027 .163 .038 .191 .053 .223
Subsidized .691 .462 .633 .482 .699 .459
Informally subsidized .177 .382 .206 .404 .135 .342
Age of head 44.438 11.424 45.228 11.84 45.247 11.751
Age of spouse 40.338 10.62 41.065 11.142 41.118 11.147
Single parent .179 .383 .199 .4 .17 .375
Education level of head:
None .272 .445 .234 .423 .265 .442
Incomplete primary .437 .496 .469 .499 .431 .495
Complete primary .145 .352 .137 .344 .133 .34
Incomplete secondary .074 .262 .083 .277 .083 .275
Complete secondary  .03 .172 .022 .146 .037 .19
Education level of spouse:
None .22 .414 .209 .407 .227 .419
Incomplete primary .479 .5 .472 .499 .438 .496
Complete primary .157 .364 .153 .36 .151 .358
Incomplete secondary .076 .264 .08 .272 .092 .289
Complete secondary  .027 .162 .032 .176 .037 .189
House walls:
Brick .434 .496 .405 .491 .456 .498
Mud .421 .494 .383 .486 .334 .471
Good quality wood .104 .306 .15 .357 .171 .377
Poor quality wood .031 .173 .045 .207 .024 .152
Cardboard/none .01 .099 .016 .127 .015 .123
Has piped gas .052 .222 .094 .292 .073 .261
Has piped water .649 .477 .518 .5 .636 .481
Has sewage system .277 .447 .193 .395 .247 .431
Has rubbish collection .296 .456 .245 .43 .336 .472
No telephone .918 .275 .919 .273 .906 .292
Communal telephone .019 .137 .02 .141 .011 .103
Private telephone .063 .243 .061 .239 .083 .276
Toilet connected to sewage .498 .5 .506 .5 .524 .499
Own house .694 .461 .652 .476 .655 .475
Rented house or in
mortgage .086 .281 .085 .279 .075 .263
Occupied house without le-
gal agreement .04 .195 .032 .175 .068 .252
House in usufruct .18 .384 .231 .422 .202 .402
Householder suffered from
violence 2000–2002 .029 .169 .026 .16 .04 .197
Minutes to nearest school 13.953 17.373 15.707 19.634 13.663 17.254
Sample size 7,077 7,580 10,330
Note. Sample of households with at least one child aged 8–17 in the second survey.
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TABLE A3
PREPROGRAM TIME TRENDS IN PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD LABOR
INCOME IN TREATMENT AND CONTROL AREAS
Late-treat area 2.2708 (.5573)**
Year 2000 .6158 (.2442)*
Year 2001 1.0513 (.2849)**
Late-treat area # Year p 2000 .1294 (.2878)
Late-treat area # Year p 2001 .0836 (.3576)
N 8,003
Note. Dependent variable is per capita household labor in-
come. 1999 is the reference year. Standard errors, clustered
at municipality level, in parentheses. We control for a similar
set of regressors as in table A2 of the appendix.
* Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level or less.
** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level or less.
TABLE A4
MARGINAL EFFECT OF PROGRAM ON SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND ANTICIPATION EFFECTS,
PROBIT MODEL, WHOLE SAMPLE
Probit Model Rural 14–17 Rural 8–13 Urban 14–17 Urban 8–13
Treated (a4) .0659
(.0223)**
.0249
(.0117)*
.0566
(.0125)**
.0126
(.0057)**
Anticipation (a3) .0633
(.0280)**
.0146
(.0139)
.0299
(.0189)
.023
(.0057)
N 2,081 4,053 1,598 2,865
Note. Marginal effects are estimated using eq. (1). N is the number of treated individuals in the post-
program period. Standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Control for
variables listed in table A1 and A2 of the appendix.
* Denotes statistical significance at the 1%–5% level.
** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level or less.
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TABLE A5
COMPARISON OF CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS MATCHED AND UNMATCHED SAMPLES, GROUP 1
Unmatched Sample Matched Sample
Treated Control
p-Value
Difference Treated Control
p-Value
Difference
Female child .445 .422 .186 .444 .441 .821
Health insurance of head:
Unsubsidized .020 .034 .013 .021 .026 .256
Subsidized .681 .744 .000 .692 .713 .150
Informally subsidized .194 .104 .000 .174 .163 .404
Age of head 47.410 47.683 .478 47.377 47.449 .835
Age of spouse 42.830 43.293 .187 42.752 42.837 .789
Single parent .147 .141 .626 .141 .144 .823
Education level head:
Incomplete primary .544 .516 .121 .555 .545 .557
Complete primary .103 .101 .838 .100 .101 .956
Incomplete secondary .032 .034 .681 .032 .026 .238
Complete secondary  .013 .020 .142 .014 .014 .939
Education level spouse:
Incomplete primary .557 .531 .151 .561 .562 .944
Complete primary .121 .119 .893 .122 .101 .043
Incomplete secondary .032 .039 .300 .032 .026 .238
Complete secondary  .014 .009 .198 .014 .012 .533
House walls:
Mud .508 .461 .010 .505 .541 .024
Good quality wood .156 .221 .000 .161 .144 .142
Poor quality wood .040 .022 .005 .042 .035 .319
Cardboard/none .012 .013 .984 .012 .009 .265
Has piped gas .009 .008 .826 .010 .006 .189
Has piped water .388 .407 .282 .401 .388 .433
Has sewage system .061 .059 .828 .060 .074 .085
Has rubbish collection .063 .062 .874 .064 .072 .318
No telephone .969 .964 .413 .967 .953 .027
Communal telephone .016 .018 .787 .018 .025 .140
Toilet connected to sewage .363 .415 .003 .375 .387 .455
Own house .990 .985 .205 .990 .980 .017
Household suffered from vio-
lence 2000–2002 .028 .053 .000 .030 .046 .011
Mean absolute bias 7.542 3.739
Median absolute bias 4.784 3.389
Pseudo R2 .157 .026
Note. The absolute standardized bias is taken over all regressors. Pseudo R2 of probit model for the
selection of treated households. Bolded p-values indicate that differences are significant at less than
the 5% level.
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TABLE A6
COMPARISON OF CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS MATCHED AND UNMATCHED SAMPLES, GROUP 2
Unmatched Sample Matched Sample
Treated Control
p-Value
Difference Treated Control
p-Value
Difference
Female child .485 .463 .089 .485 .486 .944
Health insurance of head:
Unsubsidized .019 .037 .000 .021 .019 .627
Subsidized .660 .730 .000 .672 .709 .001
Informally subsidized .207 .125 .000 .187 .175 .162
Age of head 43.954 44.275 .290 43.995 44.047 .848
Age of spouse 39.126 39.749 .029 39.138 39.077 .811
Single parent .124 .138 .123 .122 .131 .224
Education level head:
Incomplete primary .516 .496 .120 .516 .517 .964
Complete primary .132 .113 .030 .134 .133 .968
Incomplete secondary .041 .049 .130 .042 .038 .388
Complete secondary  .012 .015 .466 .013 .011 .303
Education level spouse:
Incomplete primary .528 .513 .258 .531 .534 .841
Complete primary .144 .145 .890 .145 .138 .347
Incomplete secondary .042 .048 .266 .043 .046 .550
Complete secondary  .014 .014 .998 .015 .011 .173
House walls:
Mud .496 .428 .000 .490 .529 .001
Good quality wood .181 .243 .000 .186 .174 .189
Poor quality wood .041 .034 .146 .040 .032 .063
Cardboard/none .011 .015 .219 .011 .008 .184
Has piped gas .007 .007 .885 .008 .010 .290
Has piped water .398 .404 .684 .408 .405 .789
Has sewage system .057 .054 .630 .059 .074 .008
Has rubbish collection .057 .064 .213 .059 .071 .037
No telephone .964 .967 .561 .964 .954 .044
Communal telephone .023 .019 .288 .022 .024 .519
Toilet connected to sewage .336 .379 .001 .347 .367 .079
Own house .990 .987 .190 .990 .986 .074
Household suffered from vio-
lence 2000–2002 .031 .050 .000 .033 .052 .000
Mean absolute standardized
bias 6.876 2.848
Median absolute standardized
bias 3.677 1.582
Pseudo R2 .142 .019
Note. The absolute standardized bias is taken over all regressors. Pseudo R2 of probit model for the
selection of treated households. Bolded p-values indicate that differences are significant at less than
the 5% level.
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TABLE A7
COMPARISON OF CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS MATCHED AND UNMATCHED SAMPLES, GROUP 3
Unmatched Sample Matched Sample
Treated Control
p-Value
Difference Treated Control
p-Value
Difference
Female child .464 .467 .898 .461 .459 .907
Health insurance of head:
Unsubsidized .048 .061 .089 .049 .055 .518
Subsidized .653 .670 .340 .662 .671 .600
Informally subsidized .175 .161 .287 .170 .164 .658
Age of head 46.556 47.063 .219 46.674 46.703 .946
Age of spouse 43.340 43.603 .490 43.363 43.300 .872
Single parent .292 .219 .000 .264 .264 .985
Education level head:
Incomplete primary .354 .377 .185 .366 .376 .583
Complete primary .171 .153 .161 .158 .160 .859
Incomplete secondary .113 .095 .106 .110 .103 .560
Complete secondary  .034 .040 .355 .037 .032 .521
Education level spouse:
Incomplete primary .406 .386 .249 .409 .420 .528
Complete primary .180 .159 .125 .167 .165 .896
Incomplete secondary .108 .119 .354 .108 .112 .704
Complete secondary  .043 .051 .280 .046 .038 .305
House walls:
Mud .265 .224 .008 .265 .275 .529
Good quality wood .064 .112 .000 .068 .056 .161
Poor quality wood .031 .019 .045 .028 .024 .440
Cardboard/none .013 .014 .833 .013 .012 .806
Has piped gas .185 .138 .000 .185 .178 .611
Has piped water .828 .849 .109 .824 .857 .017
Has sewage system .474 .404 .000 .459 .509 .008
Has rubbish collection .563 .559 .830 .546 .566 .272
No telephone .847 .850 .809 .856 .858 .913
Communal telephone .018 .004 .000 .012 .012 .968
Toilet connected to sewage .730 .628 .000 .716 .731 .354
Own house .969 .962 .303 .968 .971 .665
Household suffered from vio-
lence 2000–2002 .028 .029 .927 .027 .029 .722
Mean absolute standardized
bias 7.227 3.134
Median absolute standardized
bias 4.172 1.992
Pseudo R2 .108 .027
Note. The absolute standardized bias is taken over all regressors. Pseudo R2 of probit model for the
selection of treated households. Bolded p-values indicate that differences are significant at less than
the 5% level.
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TABLE A8
COMPARISON OF CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS MATCHED AND UNMATCHED SAMPLES, GROUP 4
Unmatched Sample Matched Sample
Treated Control
p-Value
Difference Treated Control
p-Value
Difference
Female child .485 .489 .737 .485 .487 .871
Health insurance of head:
Unsubsidized .053 .067 .030 .056 .060 .535
Subsidized .649 .670 .097 .664 .673 .492
Informally subsidized .179 .146 .001 .162 .159 .759
Age of head 43.399 43.941 .100 43.676 43.769 .781
Age of spouse 40.101 39.931 .587 40.171 40.137 .916
Single parent .256 .184 .000 .233 .249 .175
Education level head:
Incomplete primary .360 .365 .739 .372 .386 .284
Complete primary .164 .155 .374 .153 .156 .785
Incomplete secondary .142 .128 .125 .139 .136 .720
Complete secondary  .049 .064 .015 .049 .041 .190
Education level spouse:
Incomplete primary .383 .363 .122 .388 .398 .448
Complete primary .180 .168 .232 .170 .170 .982
Incomplete secondary .144 .140 .659 .139 .141 .849
Complete secondary  .056 .063 .252 .057 .049 .210
House walls:
Mud .272 .250 .065 .277 .282 .693
Good quality wood .067 .120 .000 .071 .053 .007
Poor quality wood .038 .018 .000 .033 .028 .343
Cardboard/none .016 .018 .530 .014 .016 .704
Has piped gas .153 .124 .002 .151 .147 .676
Has piped water .826 .818 .477 .819 .838 .074
Has sewage system .467 .410 .000 .462 .497 .012
Has rubbish collection .549 .568 .164 .547 .564 .225
No telephone .858 .860 .861 .859 .857 .796
Communal telephone .016 .005 .000 .010 .010 .976
Toilet connected to sewage .704 .641 .000 .699 .711 .316
Own house .953 .959 .311 .953 .956 .661
Household suffered from vio-
lence 2000–2002 .021 .034 .003 .022 .024 .570
Mean absolute standardized
bias 7.050 2.824
Median absolute standardized
bias 4.027 1.461
Pseudo R2 .091 .026
Note. The absolute standardized bias is taken over all regressors. Pseudo R2 of probit model for the
selection of treated households. Bolded p-values indicate that differences are significant at less than
the 5% level.
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